Attack Chains
Tools change constantly. Loaders, C2 frameworks, ransomware brands, stealer families, all of it rotates. The prerequisite conditions at each stage don't. These mapped chains show how every actor converges on the same chokepoints regardless of toolset. Detect the chokepoint, catch any actor.
Why Map Attack Chains?
Map enough threat actors against the same kill chain and a pattern falls out fast. Independent groups with different tools, different infrastructure, and different affiliations all converge on the same techniques at each stage.
That convergence isn't coincidence. It's architecture. Lateral movement requires authentication and remote process creation. File encryption requires stopping backup services and deleting shadow copies. The OS and the network dictate those prerequisites, not the attacker. The tools rotate. The requirements don't.
That's where the ROI is. Techniques that show up under every actor in the matrix are universal chokepoints. One detection rule covers every group.
Methodology adapted from Kaspersky's Common TTPs of Modern Ransomware Groups (2022).
Cross-Chain Ecosystem
No chain runs in isolation. Infostealers harvest the credentials that fund ransomware. AiTM kits steal the sessions that enable account takeover and BEC.
How to read an attack chain
Initial Access → Credential Access → Lateral Movement → Defense Evasion → Impact. BlackBasta, LockBit 3.0, Akira, Alphv/BlackCat, and Play mapped against the same five chokepoints to show where every group converges.
InfostealerDistribution → Execution → Collection → Exfiltration → Monetization. RedLine, LummaC2, Vidar, StealC, and Raccoon mapped through the full chain, including how harvested credentials feed the RaaS ecosystem downstream.
AiTMLure Delivery → Proxy Interception → Token Harvest → Account Takeover → Persistence & Objectives. Tycoon 2FA, Evilginx, EvilProxy, Sneaky 2FA, and Device Code Flow. Every kit bypasses MFA the same way: by stealing the session token, not the password.
HypervisorInitial Access → Mgmt Plane Takeover → Credential Theft → Persistence → Lateral Movement → Impact. BRICKSTORM/UNC5221, UNC3886, Scattered Spider, Play, and ALPHV. All operating beneath the guest OS, where EDR cannot see them.
IdentityInitial Access → Credential Access → Privilege Escalation → Lateral Movement → Persistence → Impact. APT29, Storm-0501, Storm-2372, Scattered Spider, and ransomware operators. All exploiting the same protocol-level invariants from Kerberos through to Entra ID.