Infostealer Attack Chain
How infostealer operators all follow the same five-stage chokepoint sequence — regardless of family, brand, or C2 infrastructure.
Every actor in the matrix below follows the same sequence of stages — they must, because each stage reflects an unavoidable prerequisite condition. Their tools, loaders, and C2 infrastructure change constantly. The underlying chokepoints do not. Detect the prerequisite; catch any actor.
TTP Overlap Across Groups
Each box represents a MITRE ATT&CK technique. Colored dots indicate which groups or families use that technique — techniques where all dots are filled are universal chokepoints and the highest-value targets for detection engineering. Hover or focus a technique for detail.
Attack Flow
Three swimlanes show the attacker's actions, mapped ATT&CK techniques, and detection posture at each stage. Exploited (detection gap) Detected (opportunity) Blocked (control active) Hover or focus a stage for ATT&CK detail.
Chokepoint Opportunities by Stage
Each card shows the invariant prerequisite an attacker must satisfy at that stage, the top detection signals, and links to the full chokepoint analysis.
Delivery mechanism reaches target user's endpoint
- Download from newly registered domain (<90 days old)
- Browser navigating to typosquatted software download site
- Installer with missing or untrusted digital signature
User action triggers payload (no AV block / sandbox)
- Executable launched from %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\ or %TEMP%\
- Browser process spawning unexpected child process
- LOLBin chain: mshta → wscript → rundll32 (no legitimate parent)
File system access to browser profile dirs + DPAPI decryption privilege
- Non-browser process reading Chrome/Firefox SQLite credential stores
- DPAPI CryptUnprotectData call from unexpected process
- Bulk file reads under %APPDATA%\*\Chromium\ or %APPDATA%\Mozilla\
Outbound network connectivity from infected host
- Non-browser process making HTTPS POST with payload >1 MB
- Outbound connection to Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) from non-user process
- Compressed archive (.zip/.7z) created then immediately sent over network
Harvested credential data has market value; buyer infrastructure exists
- VPN/SaaS login from new geo-location with valid credentials (downstream)
- Session token reuse from unfamiliar IP/device fingerprint
- Account behavior anomaly after credential exposure window
Actor Convergence Matrix 5 actors tracked
Different tools. Different operators. Same chokepoints. The highlighted bottom row shows the invariant prerequisite condition your detections must cover — regardless of which actor you're facing.
| Actor | Distribution | Execution | Collection | Exfiltration | Monetization |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RedLine Disrupted | Malvertising / cracked software SEO | User double-clicks fake installer EXE | Chrome/Firefox SQLite + crypto wallets (DPAPI) | HTTPS POST to C2 panel | IAB dark web marketplace sale |
| LummaC2 Active | Fake CAPTCHA / ClickFix lure pages | LOLBin chain (mshta → wscript → rundll32) | Browsers + 2FA extensions + crypto wallets (DPAPI) | Encrypted HTTPS POST to rotating C2 | IAB sale + direct RaaS operator supply |
| Vidar Active | Malvertising / YouTube description links | MSI / NSIS installer execution | Browsers + 2FA tokens + crypto wallets (DPAPI + Telegram token) | HTTP POST + Telegram Bot API C2 | IAB marketplace listing |
| StealC Active | SEO poisoning / malvertising | User-executed signed-looking binary | Browsers + Discord tokens + Telegram sessions | HTTP POST to admin panel | IAB sale / direct buyer negotiation |
| Raccoon Disrupted | Phishing / malvertising | User-executed EXE or MSI | Browsers + email clients + crypto wallets | HTTP POST to C2 | IAB marketplace |
| The Chokepoint | Delivery mechanism reaches target user's endpoint | User action triggers payload (no AV block / sandbox) | File system access to browser profile dirs + DPAPI decryption privilege | Outbound network connectivity from infected host | Harvested credential data has market value; buyer infrastructure exists |
References
- HudsonRock Infostealer Data
- RedCanary Threat Detection Report
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1555 (Credentials from Password Stores)
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie)
- Cyberint IAB Analysis
Related Attack Chains
- Ransomware - Often follows infostealer-provided access